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**OECD Countries: Medium-Term  
Economic Prospects and Some  
Alternative Policy Scenarios**

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ER 77-10517  
August 1977

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## OECD Countries: Medium-Term Economic Prospects and Some Alternative Policy Scenarios

*Central Intelligence Agency  
Directorate of Intelligence*

*August 1977*

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### *Summary*

#### **The Outlook**

Demand in the OECD area, particularly in Western Europe, appears too sluggish to return the developed countries to their historical long-term growth paths, at least through 1978. Indeed, unless government policies change considerably in coming months, this year's anticipated 4.2-percent growth of real GNP will barely be exceeded in 1978.

Among the larger industrial countries, the United States and Japan should experience relatively vigorous growth well into 1978. The important West German economy, expected to be boosted by a stimulation package this fall, next year should exceed the 4.0-percent rise in GNP likely for 1977. Among the other major developed nations, France and Italy seem likely to repeat their low 1977 growth rates; Canada and Britain should do somewhat better next year. The smaller OECD members may top their expected 3.1-percent rise in national output for 1977 by a little, helped by the continuing increase in demand in the larger industrial countries.

While total domestic demand in the major foreign developed nations should strengthen next year, gains will be spotty. In France and Britain, an acceleration in real wage gains is expected to spur private consumption. In most of the six largest foreign economies, excess capacity, relatively slow monetary growth, and increasing uncertainties about future economic conditions and hence profitability seem to be preventing any strong upturn in investment. Gross fixed business spending probably will only edge up at close to 1977 rates next year, except in Britain and Canada, where improvements in underlying business conditions could help firms make moderate increases in capital outlays. While foreign balances should add a little to

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growth in most countries next year, inventory changes will make negative contributions, especially in West Germany.

Economic policy remains cautious throughout the OECD area, and only a few significant changes are expected in coming months. Notably, Bonn and Tokyo are both apt to up their stimulative efforts later this year. Bonn, concerned about growth and employment prospects, probably will cut taxes and reinstitute an investment tax credit this fall. Tokyo is likely to pass a \$4 billion supplementary budget later this year to extend the acceleration in public outlays under way since last April.

Few policy changes appear to be in the cards for 1978. Regardless of the outcome of the French parliamentary election, Paris seems likely to switch to a more expansionary stance. A leftist government undoubtedly would stress consumption in contrast to the investment stimulus a center-right coalition would favor; both groups probably would allow increases in wage rates to accelerate. Among the smaller OECD countries, Turkey and Belgium are prime candidates to tighten policy considerably.

Unless economic policy becomes more expansive, unemployment seems likely to persist at high levels through 1978, and even to rise in some countries. Not enough new jobs will be created to absorb growth in labor forces. Manpower programs introduced by many governments will reduce joblessness in some sectors yet will be insufficient to solve the general unemployment problem.

Although demand will be sluggish, inflation seems likely to remain at high levels: (a) steady increases in oil prices almost certainly will continue; and (b) the lower productivity gains associated with slower economic growth mean that a greater share of wage hikes is being passed on in the form of higher prices. Spain, Turkey, and Iceland should continue to lead the OECD area in price increases next year. On the other hand, Italy and Britain may reap the rewards of current austerity programs in the form of lower inflation rates.

International payments problems will prove troublesome to many OECD countries again next year, especially the smaller European members. The smaller developed countries as a group probably will see their 1978 current-account deficit grow almost \$1 billion from this year's \$15 billion shortfall. Spain, Turkey, and Norway all are expected to run current-account deficits of \$3 billion or more in both 1977 and 1978. Of these three, Turkey, with creditors already leery, probably will encounter serious fi-

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nancing problems and have to restrict import growth. Other countries will press Japan and West Germany to reduce their big current-account surpluses. Unless Tokyo and Bonn are willing and able to cut their surpluses substantially, protectionist sentiment will mount, especially in Europe.

**Key Uncertainties**

This report was discussed in detail at a meeting with representatives of the Departments of State and Treasury, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Council of Economic Advisers. During the course of the discussion, a number of key uncertainties which could cause economic trends to deviate from our baseline forecast were identified.

Examination of prevailing uncertainties suggests that our projections of economic performance in 1977-78 are more likely to err on the high side than on the low. The likelihood of lower-than-anticipated economic growth is particularly high in both France and Britain. In France, our 1978 forecast hinges on the assumption that a victorious Francois Mitterrand would keep the Communists in line and pursue a moderate policy course, only slowly implementing the Common Program of the leftist alliance. If the more radical factions in the alliance exert greater influence than we expect, rapid deterioration in public confidence and massive capital flight probably would lead to lower GNP growth than forecast.

In Britain, we assume that the leaders of the Trades Union Congress will talk the unions into accepting only moderately larger wage gains now that pay controls have expired. A wage explosion, spurred by rank-and-file restiveness, would alter both GNP and its components—pushing consumption up and investment down. It might provoke more restrictive policy measures.

As for prospects for faster-than-expected growth, these hinge on the much less likely chance of government stimulation beyond the packages we expect this fall in Japan and West Germany. We conducted an exercise to analyze the domestic and international impact of increased stimulation by Bonn and Tokyo in 1978. For West Germany, we investigated the effects of two hypothetical government packages: (a) one in which Chancellor Schmidt increases the size of the stimulative package expected this fall, by cutting income tax rates an additional 5 percent; and (b) a second in which Schmidt sponsors an increase in government consumption that would boost GNP growth 0.5 percent. For Japan, we examined the effects of a high-option supplemental budget. Under this scenario, which has been discussed by business and some officials in Tokyo, roughly \$7 billion would be injected

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into the economy over and above the \$4 billion built into our baseline forecast.

The results of our exercise indicate that increased West German stimulation under either of the two posited scenarios would add only a little to growth in Europe but would substantially aid trade balances of countries with serious payments problems—notably France, Italy, and the smaller developed nations. On the other hand, increased stimulation by Tokyo would help the weaker OECD countries little; most of the trade benefits would accrue to the relatively strong US economy. Thus, reductions in trade barriers would seem a more effective way for Tokyo to aid other industrial countries. Under none of the scenarios did the risk of accelerated inflation appear to be excessively high.

While additional stimulation by Japan and West Germany would add only a little to world GNP growth, it would relieve the balance-of-payments constraint on other governments. As current-account pressures eased, some governments might opt to stimulate their domestic economies. Assuming all nations increased government outlays by an amount equal to the current-account improvements induced by high-option Japanese and German stimulation programs, the growth impact would be roughly double that of Bonn and Tokyo acting alone.

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## OECD Countries: Medium-Term Economic Prospects and Some Alternative Policy Scenarios

### Recent Economic Developments

Demand in the OECD<sup>1</sup> area remained weak in early 1977. Output growth was relatively strong in the first quarter but appears to have petered out in many countries more recently. Although first half GNP growth probably was up in a few key countries, in many it just matched late 1976 rates, which were generally dismal. For the seven largest countries, which account for 85 percent of the area's output, growth in second half 1976 had crumbled to only 3.2 percent as stock accumulations tapered off, consumer spending softened, and government policy became increasingly restrictive. Performance also had faltered in many smaller OECD countries, reflecting their trade dependency on the larger industrial nations.

Among the Big Seven, the United States and Japan made the strongest economic showing in first half 1977.

Table 1  
Big Seven: Real GNP

	Percent Change from Previous Period at Annual Rate <sup>1</sup>			
	Actual		CIA Estimate	
	2nd Half 1975	1st Half 1976	2nd Half 1976	1st Half 1977
Big Seven .....	5.8	6.8	3.2	4.9
United States.....	8.0	6.4	3.5	5.6 <sup>2</sup>
Japan .....	4.8	8.8	2.8	7.6
West Germany .....	4.5	7.3	3.1	3.8
France .....	4.9	6.2	3.5	2.8
United Kingdom .....	-2.9	3.9	1.8	-1.2
Italy .....	0.8	9.0	3.9	4.0
Canada .....	3.9	6.9	0.8	4.7

<sup>1</sup> Seasonally adjusted.

<sup>2</sup> Preliminary Department of Commerce data.

<sup>1</sup> By descending order of GNP, the OECD countries are: the United States, Japan, West Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Canada, Spain, the Netherlands, Australia, Sweden, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, Turkey, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Greece, Portugal, New Zealand, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Iceland.

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- The *United States* economy posted a strong 5.6-percent growth in first half 1977. While first quarter gains were concentrated in private consumption, second quarter growth was more broadly based. The April-June advance was propelled by strong increases in government spending, residential construction, and net exports of goods and services. Private consumption growth eased somewhat as consumers rebuilt their savings; with savings rates now closer to normal, healthier household spending is expected later this year.
- In *Japan*, real GNP growth rebounded sharply to an estimated 7.6-percent annual rate largely on the strength of exports and fiscal stimulus. Export volume expanded a hefty 21.5 percent in the first three months and was expected to rise at a 12.5-percent annual clip in the next three. Public investment outlays rose at a 20-percent annual rate in the first quarter, and a speed up in contract awards signaled continued high spending in the second.
- In *West Germany*, GNP probably has been rising at less than a 4-percent annual rate due to lower-than-expected export gains and weak investment spending, which have slowed growth in private demand. Fiscal policy also has dampened economic activity; during the first five months federal expenditures rose only 2 percent, while tax receipts climbed close to 10 percent. Bonn's infrastructure program is not expected to come on line until second half 1977.
- *France* experienced a continuing slowdown in early 1977, with GNP probably rising at less than a 3-percent annual rate. Stagnant private consumption is the main culprit; consumer spending in the second quarter is believed to have fallen below first quarter levels, something not experienced even during the past recession.
- The *United Kingdom* actually suffered a drop in GNP in first half 1977, largely due to the depressive impact of strict wage controls on private consumption. Investment also declined, reflecting cuts in government construction outlays. Only involuntary stockbuilding, weakened import demand, and increased North Sea oil production held the growth decline in check.
- *Italy* chalked up a surprising 4-percent increase in GNP in the first half, as part of the spurt in economic activity of fourth quarter 1976 spilled over. Demand weakened over the six-month period, however, as indicated by a steady decline in Rome's

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composite index of leading economic indicators and a recent downturn in industrial production.

- In *Canada*, the first quarter comeback in output growth was due to the performance of exports—primarily to the United States—and increased government spending. While export growth eased in the second quarter, efforts to replenish depleted inventories helped to keep Canada on a moderate growth path.

Demand has not been buoyant enough to check the rise in unemployment, particularly in Western Europe. Although total employment has grown slightly, the gains are far short of those needed to offset continued increases in labor forces. In first quarter 1977, unemployment was up in almost every OECD country, with the number of workers seeking jobs 7 percent above levels of a year earlier. Preliminary midyear data show the jobless rate still on the rise in West Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Indeed, of the major developed countries, only the United States has managed to make a dent in unemployment.

Inflation throughout the area also remains stubbornly high. About one-half of the OECD members continue to experience double-digit rates. Only three countries—the United States, West Germany, and Switzerland—have brought inflation down to under 6 percent. The early 1977 acceleration in OECD consumer prices should wash out by yearend, as pressures from international commodity prices and food prices abate.

Balance-of-payments problems persist in many countries. Only a handful of countries—Japan, West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerland—continue to have current-account surpluses.<sup>2</sup> A few countries, most notably the United Kingdom and Italy, have improved their current balances so far this year. Most, however, continue in large deficit. Turkey, teetering precariously on the edge of a foreign exchange crisis, has the most acute problem. Persistent current-account deficits have drained its reserves and lowered its credit rating; most lenders simply are not willing to increase their exposure vis-a-vis Ankara.


### **Economic Policy in 1977**

Caution in government economic policy remains widespread, and only small adjustments are expected through yearend. Policymakers in most OECD countries continue to be more concerned with persistent high infla-

<sup>2</sup>In this report, the current account includes goods, services (including reinvested earnings), and private transfers based on IMF definitions; public transfers are excluded. For detailed information on both current account definitions and the value of public transfers in 1975-76, see appendix B.

Figure 1

Selected OECD Countries:  
Unemployment Rates  
Percent Change, Seasonally Adjusted



1. Data are not comparable across countries

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Table 2

## OECD Countries: Consumer Prices

	Percent Change over Previous Period						
	1975	1976	1976 <sup>1</sup>				1977 <sup>1</sup>
			I	II	III	IV	I
Big Seven							
United States.....	9.1	5.8	4.0	5.1	6.5	4.4	5.9
Japan .....	11.1	9.3	9.4	13.5	5.0	10.3	9.4
West Germany .....	5.9	4.5	6.9	6.2	.3	2.0	4.0
France .....	11.7	9.6	10.0	9.5	9.5	10.6	9.6
United Kingdom ....	24.2	16.6	12.2	14.9	12.0	17.1	16.5
Italy .....	17.0	16.8	15.9	27.8	11.0	30.3	20.3
Canada .....	10.8	7.5	5.2	6.3	5.9	6.1	6.8
Other							
Australia .....	15.1	13.6	12.4	10.6	9.1	26.2	13.6
Austria.....	8.5	7.3	12.1	7.2	5.6	4.0	6.4
Belgium .....	12.8	9.2	8.8	8.0	7.9	6.7	7.8
Denmark .....	9.6	8.7	8.1	1.9	3.8	13.0	8.9
Finland .....	17.7	14.4	16.1	8.6	15.1	10.3	12.0
Greece .....	13.4	13.3	12.1	16.1	-1.4	20.7	11.1
Iceland .....	48.5	32.8	13.7	54.3	30.8	29.8	34.2
Ireland .....	20.9	18.0	32.7	27.2	6.2	18.0	16.6
Luxembourg .....	10.8	9.8	10.7	9.3	6.4	7.3	8.1
Netherlands.....	10.2	8.8	7.1	14.0	2.7	10.5	7.4
New Zealand .....	14.7	17.0	18.9	19.3	13.2	11.6	13.6
Norway.....	11.7	9.2	10.8	10.5	10.2	2.4	9.0
Portugal .....	15.3	19.3	41.4	-1.4	22.0	47.2	23.9
Spain .....	16.9	17.7	17.2	31.0	12.2	19.6	28.0
Sweden .....	9.8	10.0	10.3	10.9	8.4	11.7	10.8
Switzerland .....	6.7	1.7	1.9	-0.8	1.6	1.4	1.0
Turkey .....	19.2	17.3	15.9	19.7	10.4	23.2	14.8

<sup>1</sup> Not seasonally adjusted; at annual rates.

tion and with balance-of-payments problems than with production and unemployment. Of the seven largest OECD countries, France, Britain, Italy, and Canada probably will maintain restrictive economic programs through December. The United States and Japan will actively pursue expansion, while West Germany probably will give its slightly expansionary program a small boost.

*France* is likely to continue on a moderately restrictive economic policy path. Prime Minister Barre is determined to reduce inflation and to prevent the French economy from falling into an inflation/devaluation spiral as in Italy and Britain. He has indicated that a major reflation package is not in the cards despite considerable political pressure. Barre firmly believes that his current policy will dampen inflation before the March 1978 elections and

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thus help return the present coalition to power. For the rest of 1977, Paris probably will:

- Continue to pressure business and labor to keep wage increases down.
- Pursue a tight monetary policy.
- Maintain efforts to restrict public spending increases.
- Deal with unemployment through selective aid programs, especially for youth.

Paris may also implement for the first time the anti-inflation tax, which would penalize business for allowing excessive wage and price increases.

Even if the Callaghan government falls, the *United Kingdom* is apt to stick with its relatively restrictive policy. The Tories generally endorse the fiscally conservative policies of current Chancellor of the Exchequer Denis Healey. In accordance with conditions set by the IMF for a \$3.9 billion standby credit, London now intends to cut real public spending by 2 percent in the 1977-78 fiscal year. The Bank of England shows every sign of holding to a growth range of 9 to 14 percent for the money supply. The Bank already has extended the "corset" that controls the growth of interest-bearing bank liabilities for an additional six months.

Continued austerity to reduce inflation and the payments deficit is in store for *Italy*. The minority Christian Democratic government of Prime Minister Andreotti is carrying through with a \$6 billion program of tax hikes and increases in public service charges instituted last winter. Andreotti recently negotiated a mandate for another dose of austerity with the Communists and some of the smaller Italian parties. The multiparty agreement signed on 4 July calls for ceilings on public spending and another increase in the real tax burden in 1978. Meanwhile, monetary policy is being kept tight as part of Rome's loan agreement with the IMF.

Prime Minister Trudeau of *Canada* is hesitant to make any major shifts in his moderately restrictive economic policy stance for fear of exacerbating regional political tensions, especially with Quebec. Despite mounting political pressures to reduce unemployment, he remains intent on curbing domestic inflation and probably will hold to his two-year-old wage and price control program at least through yearend. Almost no increase in real government spending is planned this year, while growth in the narrow money stock will be only about 7 percent.

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Policymakers in *West Germany* remain convinced that large-scale economic stimulation would add to inflation without having much effect on unemployment, which they believe results mainly from structural weaknesses.

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In adhering to its slightly expansionary stance, the government has budgeted expenditures to rise somewhat faster this year, reflecting in part a \$1.5 billion first installment of a multiyear infrastructure program, which is currently running behind schedule.

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Germany's Growth and Stability Law allows the Chancellor to cut personal and corporate income taxes up to 10 percent and to introduce up to a 7.5-percent investment tax credit by government ordinance for one year if the economy is in disequilibrium. Thus, passage of such measures could avoid both the legislative delays and the cumbersome amendments faced by normal tax legislation.

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we feel that the size of the new stimulative package will fall short of the legal maximum. Specifically, we assume that:

- Individual and business income taxes will be cut 5 percent effective 1 September 1977.
- A 7.5-percent investment tax credit will come on line 1 January 1978.
- Growth in federal government consumption expenditures will be upped one percentage point from 7.5 percent presently planned for next year, while German regional governments will ignore Finance Minister Apel's appeal for increased local outlays.
- Union leaders, in exchange for lower taxes, will moderate their wage demands somewhat.

The impact of any additional stimulus introduced in the fourth quarter of this year, however, will not be felt until early 1978.

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In part to blunt criticism of *Japan's* large international surplus, Prime Minister Fukuda is pursuing a program of moderate stimulation. In the fiscal year starting 1 April 1977, the budget deficit is scheduled to rise considerably, to \$29 billion or 4 percent of GNP. Public works expenditures are being hiked substantially, and personal income taxes have been cut by \$2.4 billion. Because Tokyo recently accelerated the pace of public works spending, it is likely to need a supplemental budget by September. Fukuda reportedly is considering about a \$4 billion stimulation package, roughly equivalent to 0.5 percent of GNP, which we have assumed in our baseline forecast of 5.7-percent growth in 1977. Tokyo also will probably jawbone banks into further reductions in long-term interest rates.

Among the 17 smaller OECD members, 12 countries are expected to pursue neutral to restrictive policies through 1977. Spain, Australia, Austria, Finland, New Zealand, and Iceland have all instituted restrictive measures or intend to shortly. The five remaining countries are pursuing slightly to moderately expansionary policies:

- The *Netherlands* is enjoying a natural gas - induced international surplus and relatively low inflation, which are enabling The Hague to emphasize moderate expansion. The government is expected to maintain its policy of holding down public spending growth, though not to the point of crippling the economic recovery under way.
- *Norway's* fiscal and social security budgets are geared to providing a little impetus to growth. Relying on its North Sea wealth, Oslo plans to offset an anticipated decline in export growth by raising domestic demand through personal income tax cuts and increased credit availability.
- Despite a large payments deficit, *Sweden* is locked into expansionary policies. The shaky ruling coalition, the first non-Socialist government in 44 years, is unlikely to reject the Socialists' commitment to full employment. Public expenditures are scheduled to continue upward, and investment subsidies have been extended. Stockholm also plans to continue supporting business inventories, at least until late 1977.
- Though on the verge of a payments crisis, *Turkey* is trying to ignore the need for domestic austerity. Even if Prime Minister Demirel's shaky new coalition eventually accepts some restrictions on demand in return for IMF financing, lengthy negotiations and

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the usual lags in implementation ensure no impact this year. Meanwhile, total real government expenditures are likely to rise 20 percent in 1977, feeding both inflation and the payments gap.

- *Greece* is unlikely to deviate from policies geared to achieving a medium-term growth target of 6.5 percent annually. The democratic government of Prime Minister Caramanlis is pursuing this goal as essential to spurring the industrial investment needed to keep Greece competitive once in the European Community.

### The 1977 Economic Forecast

If governments stick to their generally restrictive policies as we expect, OECD GNP will likely rise only 4.2 percent this year, down substantially from the 5.2-percent increase posted last year.<sup>3</sup> This forecast is essentially unchanged from our March expectations.<sup>4</sup> In only four countries have our projections changed by more than 1.5 percentage points:

- Our forecast for *Italy* has been revised upward to reflect the effects of stronger-than-expected growth in fourth quarter 1976.
- Our forecast for *Sweden* has been cut back because of slower-than-expected export growth in early 1977.
- In *Portugal* our projections have been upped because government spending is increasing faster than budgeted, while improvement in the business climate is bringing a faster-than-expected recovery in private investment.
- The GNP outlook for *Ireland* has brightened with the recent easing in wage controls.

The decline in growth rates will be most pronounced in the Big Six, where GNP is expected to rise less than 4 percent after increasing 5 percent last year. The United States is assumed to continue its strong first half growth pattern and thus achieve the CEA's forecast of 5.0 percent. The smaller developed countries will fare a little better than in 1976, with GNP

<sup>3</sup>Our forecasts are based primarily on judgments of country experts; they are checked for internal and external consistency. (See appendix C for a detailed methodology.) Forecasts are presented to the nearest tenth of a percent to show direction and order of magnitude. They are not meant to convey a high degree of precision and must be used cautiously. Growth rates are calculated using average year data.

<sup>4</sup>See *OECD Countries: The Outlook for 1977 and Potential Impact of Stronger Stimulation*, ER 77-10120, March 1977.



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Table 3

## OECD Countries: Real GNP

	Percent Change	
	1976	CIA Forecast August 1977
OECD .....	5.2	4.2
Big Seven		
United States.....	6.1	5.0 <sup>1</sup>
Japan .....	6.3	5.7
West Germany .....	5.7	4.0
France .....	4.8	3.7
United Kingdom .....	1.8	0.9
Italy .....	5.6	2.4
Canada .....	4.6	3.5
Other		
Australia .....	2.5	2.0
Austria.....	5.2	4.0
Belgium .....	2.3	3.0
Denmark .....	5.5	2.0
Finland .....	0.3	3.0
Greece .....	6.0	6.5
Iceland .....	0	1.7
Ireland .....	3.5	4.0
Luxembourg .....	2.3	2.7
Netherlands.....	4.0	4.4
New Zealand .....	-3.5	-1.5
Norway .....	5.7	6.5
Portugal.....	3.3	5.5
Spain .....	1.7	2.4
Sweden .....	1.2	0.9
Switzerland .....	-0.1	1.2
Turkey .....	8.1	6.5

<sup>1</sup> Derived from official Council of Economic Advisers estimate of growth between fourth quarter 1976 and fourth quarter 1977.

inching up 3.1 percent, largely as a result of spillover from last year's growth in the larger developed countries.

For the Big Six, the sluggish GNP forecast masks an even gloomier underlying trend. Domestic demand in these countries is expected to expand about 3 percent after rising almost 5 percent last year.

Under the onslaught of wage and price controls in most of the Big Six and higher tax burdens in some, *private consumption*, which accounts for 60 percent of Big Six GNP, is expected to grow only 3.2 percent, compared with 3.7 percent last year. Of the Six, only

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West Germany is expected to post a gain in consumer spending, fostered by a 10-percent hike in pension payments in July and increased growth in real wages. In Britain, consumer spending should decline. Despite the termination of rigid pay guidelines and a reduction in personal income taxes, consumer spending during the second half of the year probably will be unable to offset the first half drop.

In line with the cautious policy stance of most Big Six governments, the growth of *public consumption* is expected to slow this year in all of the Six except West Germany and Italy. Public consumption growth should slow the most in Britain due to austerity cuts in overall government spending. To enforce spending ceilings, London will continue to regulate departmental outlays through a system of cash limits. If inflation accelerates, this could lead to forced reduction in public sector employment.

*Investment* is expected to remain weak, rising only a little more than last year. Excess capacity, slow monetary growth, and increasing uncertainties over future sales are stifling investment growth in most countries; political uncertainties add to the poor business climate in Italy and France. Only West Germany and Japan are expected to post noticeable gains in gross fixed investment. Higher profits and better credit conditions are encouraging German business, while a substantial hike in public works spending is leading Japan's investment growth.

*Inventory changes* are expected to be basically neutral in the Six this year, following a mildly expansionary contribution last year. Stockbuilding may actually slow economic growth in Italy and Canada, while adding marginally to it in West Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom.

Real net foreign demand should make a small contribution to economic growth in all the major foreign developed countries this year. Although export growth in all of the Six will be lower than last year, in most cases import growth will be even more sluggish. Only West Germany and Japan—the two major foreign industrial countries following expansionary policies—will likely see the contributions to growth of their net foreign sectors decline.

The current-account position of the Big Six will actually swing into strong surplus this year. Net exports of goods and services together with private transfers should total \$7 billion, compared with a \$1 billion deficit

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Table 4

## Big Six Countries: Real GNP and Selected Components

	Percent Change									
	GNP		Private Consumption		Government Consumption		Gross Fixed Investment		Domestic Demand <sup>1</sup>	
	1976	1977	1976	1977	1976	1977	1976	1977	1976	1977
Big Six .....	5.0	3.8	3.7	3.2	3.2	2.6	3.3	3.9	4.8	3.2
Japan .....	6.3	5.7	4.4	4.3	4.4	3.3	4.8	6.8	4.8	5.1
West Germany .....	5.7	4.0	3.6	4.5	2.6	3.0	5.1	5.0	5.4	4.2
France .....	4.8	3.7	4.3	3.5	4.7	3.3	4.5	2.5	6.6	3.2
United Kingdom .....	1.8	0.9	0.2	-0.8	2.8	1.3	-4.3	-2.4	1.5	-0.1
Italy .....	5.6	2.4	3.2	2.4	1.9	2.0	2.3	2.5	5.5	1.1
Canada .....	4.6	3.5	6.3	4.1	3.0	2.1	0.8	0.5	4.5	3.0
	Exports of Goods and Services		Imports Of Goods and Services		Net Foreign Demand <sup>2</sup>		Total Final Demand		Inventory Changes <sup>2</sup>	
	1976	1977	1976	1977	1976	1977	1976	1977	1976	1977
	1976	1977	1976	1977	1976	1977	1976	1977	1976	1977
Big Six .....	11.5	7.6	10.9	5.3	0.3	0.7	3.8	3.9	1.3	-0.1
Japan .....	17.1	9.0	7.9	5.0	1.7	0.9	6.1	5.7	0.3	0.1
West Germany .....	11.8	7.0	11.0	8.0	0.5	0	4.2	4.2	1.5	0.3
France .....	9.7	9.3	19.5	7.1	-1.7	0.5	2.6	3.7	2.1	0
United Kingdom .....	6.9	6.2	6.3	2.5	0.2	1.1	0.1	0.4	1.2	0.5
Italy .....	12.6	8.0	13.1	2.5	0.3	1.3	3.1	3.7	2.6	-1.2
Canada .....	9.5	6.0	8.1	3.5	-0.1	0.4	4.6	3.5	1.1	-0.9

<sup>1</sup> GNP less net foreign demand.<sup>2</sup> Changes expressed as a percent of GNP in the previous year.

last year. The \$8 billion improvement is due largely to Japan's mushrooming surplus. Tokyo's gains on the international market underscore the role increased export sales are playing in Japan's present economic recovery. West Germany's surplus should decline a little, while the rest of the Six should see their combined deficit fall by about \$6 billion. Britain will finally break into the black on the strength of North Sea oil exports, particularly in the second half of the year. Largely on the strength of austerity measures, Italy should move roughly into balance. As a group, the smaller OECD members should see their current-account deficit hold at about \$15 billion.

The expected \$8 billion improvement in the non-US OECD current-account balance will be roughly matched by a likely \$9 billion deterioration in the US account and an expected \$2 billion improvement in the payments position of non-OPEC LDCs. With Communist countries, South Africa, and

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Israel as a group accumulating a \$12 billion deficit this year, OPEC's surplus will probably fall by \$2 billion, to around \$40 billion.

Even with the slowdown in general economic growth, inflation should remain almost frozen at its current high rate. For the OECD as a whole, consumer prices should rise 8.5 percent this year, about the same as last year. Rising unit labor costs are a key factor supporting persistent high inflation now that productivity gains have slowed, in contrast to the early phases of the recovery. In addition, demand still is firm enough compared with the 1974-75 recession years for producers to risk restoring profit margins. Most Big Six countries will see some price pressure abatement in 1977. For the year as a whole, Britain should be able to hold prices in check. Only Italy will experience accelerating gains for all of 1977. Italian producers apparently shoved prices up sharply early in the year to improve profit margins during a short-lived upswing in industrial production last winter.

Joblessness likely will stick at current high levels. Because of the highly structural nature of unemployment in many developed countries, even more rapid growth may have done little to substantially reduce the number out of work. Selective manpower programs introduced by many governments may help ease unemployment in a number of countries toward yearend. Bonn, for example, has funded programs to increase labor mobility, offset training costs for young workers, and increase part-time community service employment. London has extended a temporary employment subsidy program that pays employees to keep on workers through March 1978. Programs to aid

Table 5

OECD Countries:  
Consumer Prices and Unemployment Rates

	Consumer Prices (Percent Change)		Unemployment Rates (Percent)	
	1976	1977	1976	1977
OECD .....	8.3	8.5	NA <sup>1</sup>	NA <sup>1</sup>
United States .....	5.8	6.0	7.0	6.5
Big Six .....	9.9	9.7	NA <sup>1</sup>	NA <sup>1</sup>
Japan .....	9.3	8.3	1.9	1.8
West Germany .....	4.5	4.0	4.5	4.5
France .....	9.6	8.5	4.9 <sup>2</sup>	5.2 <sup>2</sup>
United Kingdom .....	16.6	16.4	5.8	6.0
Italy .....	16.8	21.0	4.0	4.2
Canada .....	7.5	7.0	8.0	8.2

<sup>1</sup> Data are not comparable across countries.

<sup>2</sup> CIA series.

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disabled workers and reduce unemployment in the construction industry also have been introduced in Britain.

**Economic Prospects in 1978**

Any look at economic developments beyond 1977 must of course be fraught with grave uncertainties. The course of economic events will depend heavily on the policies governments follow and on international developments over which governments have no control. For the purposes of this exercise, for instance, we are assuming no major changes in the real price of energy or of agricultural goods. If either of these rose substantially, world economic prospects would dim and international debt problems would be intensified. In turn, economic policies probably would become more restrictive, adding to the deflationary impact of a large oil or food price hike.


Economic policies in 1978 will be a mixed bag, with changes expected in few countries. We assume that:

- US policy will achieve the 5.0-percent growth target recently indicated by CEA Chairman Schultze.
- West Germany will feel the economic impact of its fall 1977 stimulative package but will not take additional measures.
- French policy will become more expansionary following a leftist victory in March elections.
- Policy in the rest of the Six will stay close to its current course.
- Policy will tighten in a few smaller OECD countries such as Belgium and Turkey and will remain close to its current stance in the rest of the OECD.

Given our policy assumptions, it seems likely that this year's sluggish economic performance will carry over into 1978. At the present time, we see OECD GNP rising 4.5 percent, up fractionally from this year's growth. Domestic demand in the Big Six should strengthen overall, but gains will be spotty. Stepped up wage increases augur for stronger consumption in France and Canada. Private gross fixed investment is expected to respond positively to improved underlying business conditions in Britain and Canada. Domestic demand in the smaller countries seems likely to stagnate due to restrictive policies in some and to lagged effects of slowed Big Six growth in 1977.

Figure 2

Selected OECD Countries:  
Likely Growth in Real GNP and Consumer Prices in 1978



<sup>1</sup> GNP growth target indicated by CEA Chairman Schultze; OECD estimate of the change in prices for 1st half 1978.

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Table 6

## OECD Countries: Real GNP and Domestic Demand

	Percent Change					
	GNP			Domestic Demand		
	Actual	CIA Forecast		Actual	CIA Forecast	
		1976	1977		1976	1977
OECD .....	5.2	4.2	4.5	5.4	4.1	4.5
Big Six <sup>1</sup> .....	5.0	3.8	4.2	4.8	3.2	4.1
Smaller developed countries .....	2.9	3.1	3.4	3.1	2.9	2.6

<sup>1</sup> Japan, West Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy, and Canada.

While GNP growth should be close to 1977 rates next year, we expect problem areas boding ill for OECD economic health over the rest of the decade to develop.

In *France*, moderate GNP gains in 1978 are likely to be accompanied by increasing economic disequilibrium. In the event of a leftist victory that leaves the Socialists with the major say in policy—the most plausible outcome at the moment—we would anticipate sharply stepped up government spending and hiring along with a sizable hike in the minimum wage, which would boost consumption, inflation, and the payments deficit. Wary businessmen, however, will be very reluctant to hire or to invest. Chances for balanced growth would be much better in the event of a center-right victory. The main worry then would be worker backlash in the form of strikes that could disrupt production and lead to inflationary wage settlements.

*Japan* likely will maintain strong 6-percent growth next year. Under current policies, domestic demand would increase a little, but exports would remain the spur to economic activity. Unless corrective actions were taken, Japan's current-account surplus seems likely to rise again, heightening the risk of retaliatory trade controls in Europe.

*West Germany* will increase its growth rate a little, to 4.4 percent next year, but weaker export performance will further dampen chances of an investment boom. This growth rate will be insuffi-

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ciently high to reduce Bonn's current-account surplus by much. Pressure from EC partners for actions to cut the surplus are likely to mount. The current-account surplus should, however, tighten after 1978, as export growth is stifled by continued slow world economic growth and by lagged effects of substantial deutsche mark appreciation in recent years.

*Britain's* economic fortunes should turn up in 1978, but sustained improvement is questionable. Thanks to North Sea resources, the UK will enjoy a comfortable payments position. If London sticks to its current policy of trying to channel more resources from consumption into investment, the economy could be moved into a healthier long-term growth pattern. However, the government—whether Labor or Tory—will undoubtedly come under considerable pressure from the unions to use the benefits of North Sea energy to make up for declines in real incomes suffered in recent years.

The political consensus for sustained austerity should continue to hold GNP growth in *Italy* down next year. Increasing unemployment among youth, however, could add to discontent among the Communist Party's rank and file, spurring party chief Berlinguer to demand greater political concessions in return for continued cooperation on the economic front.

In *Canada*, GNP growth will accelerate next year, possibly to 4.6 percent or about 1 percentage point below the historical trend.



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Although growth in the *smaller OECD members* will pick up a little next year, these countries will remain highly dependent on international trade and hence vulnerable to any disruption in the world economy. Any major downturn in trade, whether due to the cumulative impact of restrictive policies on world demand or to protectionist measures, would seriously undermine the shaky recoveries under way in these countries and further weaken already shaky coalition governments in many of them.

Although demand will likely be flaccid next year, inflation probably will remain disturbingly high. For the entire OECD, the rate should fall only



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slightly, to 7.8 percent. Lack of progress seems to be associated in part with the steady increases in oil prices that now appear built into the post - oil embargo world. Aided by indexation, these gains are passed on to wages, which in turn help support a higher inflation rate. Slowed productivity growth linked with the sluggish economic pace expected through 1978 also ensures difficulty in reducing inflation. Those countries that are experiencing excessive price increases this year—Italy, Britain, Spain, Iceland, Portugal—seem most likely to make some progress next year, though their rates will remain substantially above the expected OECD average. France and Turkey could experience accelerated inflation rates, while most of the other countries seem destined to repeat 1977 performances.

Unemployment will also remain high throughout the OECD. In the Big Six, only West Germany and Japan will likely keep the jobless rate from rising. German unemployment should be held down by Bonn's manpower programs; Japanese GNP growth will be strong enough to more than absorb new labor force entrants. Other Big Six nations, like many of the smaller developed countries, probably will be unable to generate enough job openings to meet growing labor force requirements.

International payments pressures will likely intensify within the OECD next year. The Big Six, on the one hand, will see their aggregate position improve. Britain will likely post a strong surplus due to increased North Sea oil flows, while Italy will improve its position enough to offset a large portion of net government transfer outflows. France and Canada will see their payments positions deteriorate. The smaller developed countries, on the other hand, will see their combined deficit increase by some \$0.7 billion, provoking domestic pressure for further import restrictions.

**Possible Deviations From the Baseline Forecast**


Sorting through all the uncertainties surrounding economic developments this year and next, we believe on balance that to the extent our projections of GNP growth are incorrect, the error is on the high side. The outlook for investment remains particularly murky. Given the grave doubts businessmen have about the strength of demand for their products and the uncertainties about the long-run rate of return on their investments, business spending could be slacker than we have anticipated.

If indeed our GNP forecasts are too high, unemployment would probably rise more than we have indicated. In turn, increased numbers of jobless would add to public transfer payments and lead to a tightening of funds

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OECD Countries: Current Account Balances<sup>1</sup>

Figure 3



1. Including goods, services (including reinvested earnings), and private transfers based on IMF definitions. The current account figures used for the United States differ from official US data by \$10.5 billion in 1975 and \$10.8 billion in 1976. The difference is due to our inclusion of roughly \$6 billion in net reinvested earnings and excluding \$4 billion in public grants. US payments projections for 1977 and 1978 were based on Department of Commerce trade projections and an assumption of 17 percent growth in net services coupled with an outflow of about \$1 billion in net private transfers.

2. Estimated.

3. Projected.

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available for investment. Slacker-than-forecast demand would probably not help much on the inflation front. In fact, price increases could be even higher than we have indicated if a few key governments lose their grip over wage curbs. Hence, cost pressures could then force businessmen to push up prices to preserve slim profit margins. The impact of all these developments on current-account balances is particularly obscure since pressures would be generated in both directions.

The likelihood of lower-than-anticipated economic growth are particularly high in France and Britain. In France, our 1978 forecast hinges on the assumption that Mitterrand will keep the Communists in line and pursue a moderate policy course, going slow in implementing the Common Program. If the more radical factions in the Alliance exert greater political influence than we are assuming, rapid deterioration in public confidence and massive capital flight would probably lead to lower GNP growth than forecast. In Britain, we assume that the leaders of the Trades Union Congress will talk the unions into only moderately larger wage gains following the expiration of wage controls in July. An unexpected wage explosion spurred by rank-and-file restiveness, however, would alter both GNP and its components—pushing consumption up and investment down. Excessive wage settlements, particularly in the public sector, would also force London to rethink its economic game plan.

Prospects for higher-than-anticipated economic growth hinge on the much less likely chance of additional government stimulus, primarily in West Germany and Japan. Stronger government action than we now anticipate would accelerate growth in the stimulating countries and in their trading partners, adding to inflation at the same time. It would also shift international balances in favor of nonstimulating OECD members. West Germany and Japan are the two most likely candidates for further stimulation in 1978. Both nations will be relatively well positioned to take the initiative, since they are likely to be experiencing only moderate inflation and large current-account surpluses. Increased Japanese and German stimulation, by easing trading partners payments constraints, could give additional breathing space to other governments.

To roughly quantify the likely impact of more expansionary economic policy, we used a linked model of the world economy. This model consists of moderate-size country models for each major developed nation and

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smaller models for non-oil LDCs and the smaller developed countries.<sup>5</sup> We exercised the model to help us judge the domestic and international effects of German and Japanese stimulation.

For Germany, we investigated the effects of two different government packages: a) the first scenario assumed that Chancellor Schmidt introduces a high-option stimulation package that cuts corporate and personal taxes by 10 percent—the full amount allowable under the Growth and Stability Law and b) a second scenario assumed government consumption was boosted sufficiently to add 0.5 percent to GNP growth. For Japan, we examined the effect of a high-option supplemental budget. Under the high option, which is being discussed in Tokyo, roughly \$7 billion would be injected into the economy over and above the presently expected \$4 billion supplemental budget. Finally, we also used the model to help determine the growth impact on the OECD area of increased government expenditure in other countries equal to the amount of current-account improvement that would result from high-option policy courses in both Japan and West Germany.

On the basis of these exercises, we conclude:

- Additional stimulation by West Germany and Japan would add very little to GNP growth in the OECD area as a whole.
- It would raise prices substantially less than the increase in GNP in either country; inflation in trading partners would be virtually unaffected.
- Stimulation by West Germany would have a significant impact on the trade balances of Europe's smaller countries, most of whom currently are plagued with financing problems. It would also help the larger European countries, particularly France.
- Stimulation by Japan would do little to help reduce deficit OECD countries' payments problems, having a strong effect only on the United States. Reduction of import barriers and other actions to directly effect trade seem a better way for Tokyo to impact deficit countries.

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<sup>5</sup> For further details on the structure of our link model call [REDACTED] on 351-7402 or [REDACTED] on 351-5911. The results of the link model were cross-checked using more detailed quarterly models of the German and Japanese economies based, respectively, on the German Bundesbank model and the Japanese Economic Planning Agency model.

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- Additional government spending by other nations equivalent to the amount of improvement in their payments position from Japanese and German stimulation roughly doubles the growth impact of Bonn and Tokyo acting alone. The gains would be more or less evenly spread throughout the world.

**West Germany: Potential Impact of Stronger Stimulation**

The first of our German scenarios, invoking the maximum measures available under the Growth and Stability Law, would have very little impact on our baseline forecasts for West Germany and its OECD partners. At most, the United States, France, and the smaller developed countries as a group would see their current account positions improve some \$100 million each. To have a noticeable impact on its trade partners, Bonn would have to opt for our second scenario. We have emphasized public consumption in this alternative, since we are assuming investment and tax measures would already be on line and that the left wing of the Social Democrats would insist on consumption-oriented spending increases.

Our analysis indicates that for Bonn to boost its GNP growth to one-half of a percent in 1978 (4.9 percent by our forecast) government consumption expenditure would have to be increased roughly \$4 billion next year. This assumes that the highly conservative Bundesbank remains inflexible on its monetary growth targets, a distinct possibility. This package would increase prices by around 0.3 percent, lower the current-account surplus some \$1 billion to \$1.5 billion, and raise the total government deficit about 10 percent above the level the government presently expects.

The impact of our second scenario of German stimulation on the growth and payments positions of other OECD nations would be concentrated in Western Europe—notably in France, Britain, Italy, and the smaller developed nations as a group. All would reap small export-induced income gains of about 0.1 to 0.2 percent in 1978. In France, for example, 1978 GNP growth would rise from our current 3.9-percent baseline projection to 4.0 percent.

Under our second scenario, the likely shift in West Germany's international position also would favor Europe. The smaller developed countries, with their close trade ties to Germany, would see their combined deficit fall roughly 1 percent, or about \$200 million in 1978. Paris would see its deficit fall 4 percent below our baseline forecast, while Italy's payments position would be strengthened by 10 percent.

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Table 7

Impact of Additional West German  
Stimulation in 1978

	Percent Change in Real GNP Over Baseline Forecast	Change in Current Account (Billion US \$)
West Germany .....	0.50	-1.4
United States.....	0.02	0.3
Japan .....	0.03	0.1
France .....	0.12	0.2
United Kingdom .....	0.09	0.1
Italy .....	0.10	0.1
Canada .....	0.02	Negl
Smaller developed countries .....	0.19	0.2
Non-oil LDCs .....	0.07	0.2

**Japan: Potential Impact of Stronger Stimulation**

Tokyo has already considered the possibility of a high-option stimulative package. Last month, Toshio Komoto, chairman of the policy committee of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, indicated that a larger supplemental budget will have to be implemented if economic activity does not pick up by summer's end. Basically, we have patterned our high-option policy scenario after one proposed by the Japanese Economic Research Center (JERC) in July. Specifically, we assume that:

- Personal income tax payments will be reduced almost \$4 billion.
- Corporate income taxes will be cut almost \$2 billion.
- Government investment outlays will be stepped up by more than \$1 billion.
- These measures would be in addition to the \$4 billion stimulation we have built into our baseline forecast.

Under this high-option policy scenario, Tokyo could boost its GNP growth just over 1 percent next year, to 7.1 percent; prices would rise by less than 0.5 percent more than those forecast in our baseline projection. Increased Japanese stimulation, however, would do little to spur GNP growth or to ease payments positions in the other OECD countries. Tokyo's import demand would grow relatively slowly. This largely reflects Japan's low marginal propensity to import. Moreover, Japan buys little from indus-

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Table 8

Impact of Japan's High-Option Stimulation  
Package in 1978

	Percent Change in Real GNP Over Baseline Forecast	Change in Current Account Balance (Billion US \$)
Japan .....	1.25	-1.1
United States .....	0.03	0.3
West Germany .....	0.03	0.1
France .....	0.02	0.1
United Kingdom .....	0.04	Negl
Italy .....	0.02	Negl
Canada .....	0.04	Negl
Smaller developed countries	0.06	0.1
Non-oil LDCs .....	0.09	0.4

trial countries other than the United States. The high-option package would cut the combined deficit of the other OECD countries by \$600 million, but one-half of the gain would accrue to the United States. Assuming the non-oil LDCs did not restrict export-induced import demand, their aggregate position would improve by more than \$400 million.

**Potential Impact of Broad-Based Stimulation**

While high-option stimulation by Japan and West Germany would add little to world economic growth, it would give greater policy flexibility to other governments. As current-account pressures eased, some governments might opt to use the improvements to stimulate their domestic economies. Assuming all nations increased government outlays by an amount equal to the current-account improvement arising from joint Japanese-German stimulation, world economic growth would be given a strong nudge.

The growth impact of a joint Japanese-German expansion coupled with payments-induced stimulation elsewhere would be shared by all nations. Among developed countries, roughly one-half of the growth gains of the United States, France, Italy, and Canada arise simply from the current-account induced stimulus. Somewhat smaller gains would be made by Britain and the smaller developed countries. The trade impact on West Germany and Japan, while small, would help reduce the cost of their initial stimulation. GNP gains caused by higher exports would increase government revenue and

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Table 9

Comparison of the Income Effect of  
Alternative Stimulation Packages

	Percent		
	Joint High-Option Japanese-German Stimulation	Stimulation by Other Government	Total Stimulation
United States.....	0.05	0.05	0.10
Japan .....	1.28	0.02	1.30
West Germany .....	0.63	0.03	0.66
France .....	0.14	0.11	0.25
United Kingdom .....	0.12	0.07	0.19
Italy .....	0.12	0.12	0.24
Canada .....	0.07	0.08	0.15
Smaller developed countries .....	0.24	0.10	0.34
Non-oil LDCs .....	0.16	0.07	0.23

with it reduce the size of the budget deficit. Non-oil LDCs would also gain marginally, with GNP growth increasing from the roughly 5 percent we presently expect in 1978 to about 5.2 percent. Stimulation by countries whose payments positions improved due to German-Japanese actions provokes a negligible amount of additional inflation.



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Appendix A  
Supporting Tables

Table A-1

## OECD Countries: Consumer Prices

			Percent change	
			CIA Projection	
	1975	1976	1977	1978
OECD .....	11.9	8.3	8.5	7.8
Big Seven				
United States.....	9.1	5.8	6.0	6.0 <sup>1</sup>
Japan .....	11.1	9.3	8.3	7.4
West Germany .....	5.9	4.5	4.0	4.0
France .....	11.7	9.6	8.5	10.0
United Kingdom .....	24.2	16.6	16.4	14.5
Italy .....	17.0	16.8	21.0	12.0
Canada .....	10.8	7.5	7.0	6.6
Other				
Australia .....	15.1	13.6	15.0	10.0
Austria.....	8.5	7.3	6.2	6.5
Belgium .....	12.8	9.2	7.5	8.0
Denmark .....	9.6	8.7	8.0	8.5
Finland .....	17.7	14.4	13.5	14.0
Greece .....	13.4	13.3	12.0	9.0
Iceland .....	48.5	32.8	35.0	30.0
Ireland .....	20.9	18.0	14.0	10.0
Luxembourg .....	10.8	9.8	7.6	7.8
Netherlands.....	10.2	8.8	7.5	7.5
New Zealand .....	14.7	17.0	15.0	12.0
Norway.....	11.7	9.2	8.5	8.2
Portugal.....	15.3	19.3	35.0	20.0
Spain .....	16.9	17.7	30.0	23.0
Sweden .....	9.8	10.0	10.0	10.5
Switzerland .....	6.7	1.7	1.5	2.6
Turkey .....	19.2	17.3	23.0	28.0

<sup>1</sup> OECD estimate of the change in consumer prices during first half 1978.

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Table A-2

OECD Countries: Unemployment Rates <sup>1</sup>

	Percent			
			CIA Projection	
	1975	1976	1977	1978
Big Seven				
United States.....	8.5	7.7	7.0	6.5
Japan .....	1.9	2.0	1.9	1.8
West Germany .....	4.7	4.6	4.5	4.5
France <sup>2</sup> .....	3.8	4.3	4.9	5.2
United Kingdom .....	3.9	5.4	5.8	6.0
Italy .....	3.3	3.7	4.0	4.2
Canada .....	6.9	7.2	8.0	8.2
Other				
Australia .....	4.4	4.7	5.0	4.5
Austria.....	2.1	2.0	1.9	1.8
Belgium <sup>2</sup> .....	7.3	8.1	8.9	7.9
Denmark .....	6.0	6.1	7.0	7.0
Finland .....	2.2	4.0	5.0	4.0
Greece .....	3.6	3.0	2.5	2.5
Iceland .....	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.5
Ireland .....	12.2	12.3	11.8	10.5
Netherlands.....	5.0	5.5	5.5	6.0
New Zealand .....	0.6	1.0	1.0	0.8
Norway.....	1.1	1.1	1.0	0.9
Portugal .....	10.0	14.0	14.0	12.0
Spain .....	2.3	3.5	5.7	6.3
Sweden .....	1.6	1.5	1.9	2.2
Switzerland .....	0.3	0.7	0.5	0.5
Turkey .....	NA	NA	NA	NA

<sup>1</sup> Data are not comparable across countries.<sup>2</sup> CIA series.

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Table A-3

OECD Countries: Current-Account Balances <sup>1</sup>

			Billion US \$	
			CIA Projection	
	1975	1976	1977	1978
OECD .....	13.9	-7.2	-8.5	-6.9
Big Seven				
United States .....	22.0	9.5	0	0
Japan .....	-0.4	3.9	7.3	9.7
West Germany .....	7.5	6.8	5.3	4.0
France .....	1.1	-4.8	-3.9	-5.5
United Kingdom .....	-2.8	-1.1	2.2	4.1
Italy .....	0.9	-1.7	0	1.3
Canada .....	-4.8	-4.3	-4.1	-4.5
Other				
Australia .....	0	-1.1	-1.5	-2.0
Austria .....	-0.3	-1.5	-0.8	-0.8
Belgium/Luxembourg .....	1.2	0	0.8	1.1
Denmark .....	-0.6	-2.2	-2.0	-2.0
Finland .....	-2.2	-1.1	-0.7	-0.6
Greece .....	-1.0	-1.1	-1.1	-1.3
Iceland .....	-0.1	0	0	0
Ireland .....	-0.3	-0.5	-0.5	-0.6
Netherlands .....	2.0	2.4	2.7	3.2
New Zealand .....	-1.4	-0.7	-0.4	-0.3
Norway .....	-2.3	-3.5	-3.7	-3.9
Portugal .....	-0.8	-1.2	-1.1	-0.9
Spain .....	-3.5	-4.4	-4.7	-4.8
Sweden .....	-1.1	-1.9	-2.6	-3.5
Switzerland .....	2.7	3.6	3.6	3.4
Turkey .....	-1.9	-2.3	-3.3	-3.0

<sup>1</sup> Includes goods, services (including reinvested earnings), and private transfers, based on IMF definitions.

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Table A-4

## OECD Countries: Exchange Rates

	National Currency Units Per US \$			
	1975	1976	CIA Assumptions	
			1977	1978
Big Six				
Japan .....	296.80	296.50	272.50	262.50
West Germany .....	2.46	2.52	2.36	2.27
France .....	4.29	4.78	4.95	5.20
United Kingdom .....	0.45	0.55	0.59	0.61
Italy .....	652.85	832.29	890.00	935.00
Canada .....	1.02	0.99	1.05	1.07
Other				
Australia .....	0.76	0.82	0.89	0.91
Austria .....	17.42	17.94	16.90	18.00
Belgium .....	36.78	38.61	37.10	37.30
Denmark .....	5.75	6.05	6.35	6.66
Finland .....	3.69	3.86	4.00	4.50
Greece .....	32.29	36.58	37.50	39.00
Iceland .....	153.70	182.17	207.00	240.00
Ireland .....	0.45	0.55	0.59	0.61
Luxembourg .....	36.78	38.61	37.10	37.30
Netherlands .....	2.53	2.64	2.50	2.40
New Zealand .....	0.82	1.00	1.00	1.00
Norway .....	5.23	5.46	5.30	5.25
Portugal .....	25.55	30.22	40.00	50.00
Spain .....	57.41	66.90	74.00	85.00
Sweden .....	4.15	4.36	4.49	4.71
Switzerland .....	2.58	2.50	2.45	2.40
Turkey .....	14.44	16.05	19.00	23.00

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Table A-5

## Japan: Real GNP and Selected Components

	Percent Change			
	Actual		CIA Projection	
	1975	1976	1977	1978
Private consumption....	6.1	4.4	4.3	4.4
Government consumption.....	7.0	4.4	3.3	4.0
Gross fixed investment.	-2.8	4.8	6.8	6.6
Final domestic demand	3.0	4.5	5.0	5.1
Exports of goods and services .....	4.4	17.1	9.0	7.0
Imports .....	-8.1	7.9	5.0	5.0
Net foreign demand <sup>1</sup> ..	1.7	1.7	0.9	0.6
Total final demand .....	4.7	6.1	5.7	5.5
Inventory changes <sup>1</sup> .....	-2.1	0.3	0.1	0.4
GNP .....	2.4	6.3	5.7	5.8

<sup>1</sup>Changes expressed as a percent of GNP in the previous year.

Table A-6

## West Germany: Real GNP and Selected Components

	Percent Change			
	Actual		CIA Projection	
	1975	1976	1977	1978
Private consumption ...	2.5	3.6	4.5	5.0
Government consumption.....	3.8	2.6	3.0	3.5
Gross fixed investment ..	-4.2	5.1	5.0	4.6
Final domestic demand	1.1	3.8	4.3	4.6
Exports of goods and services .....	-6.9	11.8	7.0	7.2
Imports of goods and services .....	3.5	11.0	8.0	8.5
Net foreign demand <sup>1</sup>	-2.7	0.5	0	-0.1
Total final demand ...	-1.7	4.2	4.2	4.4
Inventory changes <sup>1</sup> .....	-0.8	1.5	0.3	-1.1
GNP .....	-2.5	5.7	4.0	4.4

<sup>1</sup> Changes expressed as a percent of GNP in the previous year.

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Table A-7

France: Real GNP and Selected Components				
	Percent Change			
	Actual		CIA Projection	
	1975	1976	1977	1978
Private consumption ...	3.5	4.3	3.5	5.5
Government consumption .....	2.8	4.7	3.3	5.0
Gross fixed investment .	-4.4	4.5	2.5	2.5
Final domestic demand	1.5	4.4	3.2	4.7
Exports of goods and services .....	-2.3	9.7	9.3	7.0
Imports of goods and services .....	-5.1	19.5	7.1	10.0
Net foreign demand <sup>1</sup>	0.5	-1.7	0.5	-0.6
Total final demand ....	2.0	2.6	3.7	4.1
Inventory changes <sup>1</sup> .....	-3.0	2.1	0	-0.1
GNP .....	-1.0	4.8	3.7	3.9

<sup>1</sup> Changes expressed as a percent of GNP in the previous year.

Table A-8

United Kingdom: Real GNP and Selected Components				
	Percent Change			
	Actual		CIA Projection	
	1975	1976	1977	1978
Private consumption ...	-0.1	0.2	-0.8	2.0
Government consumption .....	5.1	2.8	1.3	0.9
Gross fixed investment .	-0.8	-4.3	-2.4	3.6
Final domestic demand	0.7	-0.1	-0.7	2.0
Exports of goods and services .....	-3.9	6.9	6.2	5.0
Imports of goods and services .....	-6.9	6.3	2.5	4.0
Net foreign demand <sup>1</sup>	0.7	0.2	1.1	0.4
Total final demand ....	1.5	0.1	0.4	2.4
Inventory changes <sup>1</sup> .....	-2.3	1.2	0.5	-0.3
GNP .....	-1.3	1.8	0.9	2.2

<sup>1</sup> Changes expressed as a percent of GNP in the previous year.

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Table A-9

## Italy: Real GNP and Selected Components

	Percent Change			
	Actual		CIA Projection	
	1975	1976	1977	1978
Private consumption ...	-1.4	3.2	2.4	2.0
Government consumption .....	2.8	1.9	2.0	2.0
Gross fixed investment .	-13.0	2.3	2.5	1.8
Final domestic demand	-3.2	2.9	2.4	2.0
Exports of goods and services .....	3.5	12.6	8.0	7.1
Imports of goods and services .....	-9.9	13.1	2.5	2.0
Net foreign demand <sup>1</sup>	2.7	0.3	1.3	1.3
Total final demand ....	-0.4	3.1	3.7	3.2
Inventory changes <sup>1</sup> .....	-3.1	2.6	-1.2	-0.5
GNP .....	-3.5	5.6	2.4	2.7

<sup>1</sup> Changes expressed as a percent of GNP in the previous year.

Table A-10

## Canada: Real GNP and Selected Components

	Percent Change			
	Actual		CIA Projection	
	1975	1976	1977	1978
Private consumption ...	4.9	6.3	4.1	4.6
Government consumption .....	3.8	3.0	2.1	2.9
Gross fixed investment .	2.4	0.8	0.5	2.3
Final domestic demand	4.1	4.5	3.0	3.8
Exports of goods and services .....	-7.1	9.5	6.0	5.0
Imports of goods and services .....	-2.5	8.1	3.5	3.4
Net foreign demand <sup>1</sup>	-1.0	-0.1	0.4	0.2
Total final demand ....	3.3	4.6	3.5	4.2
Inventory changes <sup>1</sup> .....	-3.0	1.1	-0.9	0.3
GNP .....	0.6	4.6	3.5	4.6

<sup>1</sup> Changes expressed as a percent of GNP in the previous year.

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Table A-11

## Big Six: Real GNP and Selected Components

	Percent Change									
	GNP		Private Consumption		Government Consumption		Gross Fixed Investment		Final Domestic Demand	
	1977	1978	1977	1978	1977	1978	1977	1978	1977	1978
Big Six .....	3.8	4.2	3.2	4.1	2.6	3.1	3.9	4.5	3.3	4.1
Japan .....	5.7	5.8	4.3	4.4	3.3	4.0	6.8	6.6	5.0	5.1
West Germany .....	4.0	4.4	4.5	5.0	3.0	3.5	5.0	4.6	4.3	4.6
France .....	3.7	3.9	3.5	5.5	3.3	5.0	2.5	2.5	3.2	4.7
United Kingdom .....	0.9	2.2	-0.8	2.0	1.3	0.9	-2.4	3.6	-0.7	2.0
Italy .....	2.4	2.7	2.4	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.5	1.8	2.4	2.0
Canada .....	3.5	4.6	4.1	4.6	2.1	2.9	0.5	2.3	3.0	3.8
	Exports of Goods and Services		Imports of Goods and Services		Net Foreign Demand <sup>1</sup>		Total Final Demand		Inventory Changes <sup>1</sup>	
	1977	1978	1977	1978	1977	1978	1977	1978	1977	1978
Big Six .....	7.6	6.5	5.3	6.1	0.7	0.3	3.9	4.2	-0.1	-0.2
Japan .....	9.0	7.0	5.0	5.0	0.9	0.6	5.7	5.5	0.1	0.4
West Germany .....	7.0	7.2	8.0	8.5	0	-0.1	4.2	4.4	0.3	-1.1
France .....	9.3	7.0	7.1	10.0	0.5	-0.6	3.7	4.1	0	-0.1
United Kingdom .....	6.2	5.0	2.5	4.0	1.1	0.4	0.4	2.4	0.5	-0.3
Italy .....	8.0	7.1	2.5	2.0	1.3	1.3	3.7	3.2	-1.2	-0.5
Canada .....	6.0	5.0	3.5	3.4	0.4	0.2	3.5	4.2	-0.9	0.3

<sup>1</sup> Changes expressed as a percent of GNP in the previous year.

Table A-12

## West Germany: Domestic Impact of Additional Public Expenditures Equal to 0.5 Percent of GNP in 1978

Percent Change Over Baseline CIA Forecast	
Real GNP .....	0.50
Private consumption .....	0.28
Private investment .....	0.51
Government consumption .....	3.19
Exports of goods and services ..	0.17
Imports of goods and services ..	1.12
Consumer prices .....	0.33

Table A-13

## Japan: Domestic Impact of High-Option Stimulation in 1978

Percent Change Over Baseline CIA Forecast	
Real GNP .....	1.25
Private consumption .....	1.19
Private investment .....	1.48
Government consumption .....	-0.73
Exports of goods and services ..	0.06
Imports of goods and services ..	1.51
Consumer prices .....	0.45



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## Appendix B

## Current-Account Balance Definitions

In this report, the current account includes goods, services (including reinvested earnings), and private transfers based on IMF definitions. This payments concept, which excludes government net unrequited transfers, is used in an attempt to achieve greater international comparability among countries. For detailed information on the value of public transfers see table B-1.

The current-account figures used for the United States in this report differ from official US data, due simply to the exclusion of government grants and transfers and the inclusion of reinvested earnings. As seen in table

Table B-1

OECD Countries: Net Government  
Unrequited Transfers

	Million US \$	
	1975	1976
Big Seven		
United States.....	-3,961	-4,368
Japan .....	-263	-220
West Germany .....	-3,612	-3,746
France .....	-1,106	NA
United Kingdom .....	-839	-1,433
Italy .....	-1,446	-1,169
Canada .....	-116	-31
Other		
Australia .....	-542	-406
Austria.....	-4	-10
Belgium/Luxembourg .....	-493	-331
Denmark .....	111	265
Finland .....	-28	-15
Greece .....	14	9
Iceland.....	-1	-1
Ireland .....	215	NA
Netherlands.....	-353	-72
New Zealand .....	-8	-2
Norway .....	-171	-201
Portugal.....	-32	NA
Spain .....	-19	-16
Sweden .....	-506	-553
Switzerland .....	-134	-160
Turkey.....	10	NA

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Table B-2

United States: Comparison of Current-Account Definitions<sup>1</sup>  
1975

	Million US \$
Exports of goods .....	107,088
Imports of goods .....	-98,043
Exports of services .....	40,512
Imports of services .....	-33,392
Net private transfers .....	-904
Net government grants and transfers .....	-3,708
Current Account Balance	
(US definition) .....	11,553
less: government grants and transfers..	-3,708
plus: reinvested earnings of incorporated	
foreign affiliates .....	8,048
less: reinvested earnings of incorporated	
US affiliates .....	1,065
plus: reporting differences on goods and	
private transfers .....	-270 <sup>2</sup>
plus: statistical error .....	-9
Current Account Balance	
(CIA definition) .....	21,965

<sup>1</sup> US data obtained from June 1977 *Survey of Current Business*, pages 33 and 47.

<sup>2</sup> Difference between goods and private transfers in 1975 as reported in the June 1977 *Survey of Current Business* and the August 1977 *International Financial Statistics* of the IMF.

B-2, the difference between the two payments concepts for 1975 was almost \$10.5 billion. In 1976, the US current-account position according to the CIA definition was in surplus by \$9.5 billion, compared with a deficit of \$1.3 billion on the basis of official US data.

To obtain payments projections for this year and next, we adjusted preliminary Department of Commerce forecasts of the US trade balance, which call for a trade deficit of \$22 billion for 1977 and \$26 billion for 1978. We also assumed that net services, including retained earnings, would grow by 17 percent in both years and that net private transfer outflows would rise to \$1 billion this year and \$1.2 billion in 1978.

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Appendix C

**Forecasting Methodology**

The forecasts of economic developments in foreign developed countries presented in this report are based primarily on judgments of country experts. The judgments are derived from detailed analysis of indicators of economic activity, examination of other assessments, and extrapolation of recent trends and changes in trends.

Growth rates are calculated using average year rather than end-of-period data. Differences between these two techniques can be substantial. In the United States, for example, real GNP in 1976 rose 6 percent on an average yearly basis versus only 4.7 percent using end-of-period figures.

All forecasts are checked for internal and external consistency. These checks help uncover potential conflicts within the forecasts and increase the logical accuracy of the projections. They do not, of course, prevent forecast error resulting from inaccurate exogenous assumptions.

For the larger developed countries a number of checks are performed on major GNP components. Values over the forecast period are compared to historical trends over the past 15 years. The check includes analysis of:

**Private Consumption Expenditure**

- The implied values of the marginal and average propensities to consume out of total GNP.
- The implied values of the marginal and average propensities to consume and save out of real disposable income. Household income is derived from independent estimates of wage rates, consumer prices, employment, and hours worked. The consistency of these series is in turn cross-checked by viewing what they imply for employment-output ratios and productivity trends.

**Gross Fixed Domestic Investment**

- The ratio between investment and GNP as well as the trend pattern for each.

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**Imports**

- The implied values of the marginal and average propensity to import.
- The relationship between domestic and import prices. Import prices are checked—vis-a-vis a trade share matrix—to ensure consistency with both the world rate of inflation and likely currency realignments.

**Exports**

- The implied change in real nominal trade shares. To help ensure consistency between export growth and trading partners, import growth potential export gains are also derived assuming constant historical trade shares.
- The competitive position and changes in competitive position vis-a-vis major trading partners.
- The consistency between changes in export prices and domestic prices.

Consistency between national income account and current-account projections was also checked. Historical relationships were established between both exports and imports of goods and services on a national income account basis and a balance-of-payments basis. These relationships were then used in evaluating the logical accuracy of the current-account projections.

In smaller developed countries internal consistency is checked by viewing the relationship between GNP growth and changes in domestic demand. External consistency is provided by checks similar to those used for the larger countries.

The consistency check procedure is an iterative process. Preliminary projections supplied by country experts form the basis of the first consistency round. The results are used to modify both domestic and international income and price components for individual countries. Revised forecasts are then prepared. These are used in the second consistency round during which most remaining major inconsistencies are resolved. Further iterations are carried out if needed for specific countries. In preparing this report, roughly 300 to 350 individual forecast values were modified during the iterative process.

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## APPENDIX D

## Selected OECD Countries: Comparative Forecasts of GNP Growth

	1977			
	CIA (August 1977)	OECD (July 1977)	DRI (April 1977)	Chase-Econometrics (June 1977)
Japan .....	5.7	5.5	5.6	6.1
West Germany .....	4.0	4.0	5.0	4.5
France .....	3.7	3.0	3.7	3.5
United Kingdom .....	0.9	1.0	1.5	1.4
Italy .....	2.4	2.3	1.9	3.4
Canada .....	3.5	3.0	3.3	3.7
Spain .....	2.4	2.2	NA	2.0 <sup>1</sup>
Netherlands .....	4.4	3.5	NA	3.0 <sup>1</sup>
Belgium .....	3.0	2.8	NA	2.9 <sup>1</sup>
1978				
Japan .....	5.8	5.0 <sup>2</sup>	5.8	6.0
West Germany .....	4.4	3.8 <sup>2</sup>	4.9	3.6
France .....	3.9	3.0 <sup>2</sup>	5.4	3.4
United Kingdom .....	2.2	1.5 <sup>2</sup>	2.3	0.9
Italy .....	2.7	0.8 <sup>2</sup>	2.3	2.3
Canada .....	4.6	4.3 <sup>2</sup>	4.3	3.9
Spain .....	2.9	NA	NA	2.3 <sup>1</sup>
Netherlands .....	3.5	NA	NA	2.4 <sup>1</sup>
Belgium .....	3.0	NA	NA	1.7 <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> March 1977 projections.<sup>2</sup> Projections for first half 1978.

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